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Diminished Luster in Escambia County? 
by Neal Devins 
Escambia County, Florida v. McMillan 
(Docket No. 82-1295) 
To be argued january 10, 1983 
ISSUES 
When President Reagan signed into law the 1982 
amendments to the Voting Rights Act, he proclaimed: 
"the right to vote is the crown jewel of American liber-
ties, and we will not see its luster diminished." The 
possibility of such diminution was real, in part, because 
the Supreme Court ruled in its 1980 City of Mobile v. 
Bolden decision that both constitutional and statutory 
vote dilution challenges required proof of intentional 
racial discrimination. ( 446 U.S. 55 ( 1980)) In response to 
this decision, Congress amended section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act to prohibit any voting law or practice "im-
posed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a 
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color [or language minority states]." 
Such Congressional action led many observers to believe 
that statutory Voting Rights Act challenges to state and 
local procedures would supplant constitutional Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Fif-
teenth Amendment challenges to such procedures. The 
viability of Fourteenth Amendment voter dilution 
claims will be addressed by the Supreme Court in Escam-
bia County, Florida v. McMillan. 
The Escambia County case is of great national signifi-
cance for several reasons. First, it could determine 
whether proof of intentional racial discrimination can be 
made through reliance on result-oriented indicators. 
Second, Escambia County calls into question the constitu-
tionality of at-large elections in areas with concentrated 
minority populations. Third, the case might involve a 
determination as to the degree of deference which 
should be accorded to district court fact finding on civil 
rights matters. In addition to these issues, Escambia 
County raises the issue of whether the Florida Constitu-
tion permits unchartered county governments to unila-
terally restructure their election procedures. 
Neal Devins is a research associate at the Institute for Public 
Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University, 1208 Avenue South, 
Nashville, TN 37212; telephone (615) 322-8540. 
IssueNo.14 
FACTS 
The present lawsuit involves an appeal by the county 
to rulings that: 1) its at-large system of electing members 
of the Board of County Commissioners is unconstitu-
tional, and 2) the Board of Commissioners lacks author-
ity to modify its previous election method without voter 
approval of such modifications. These rulings were 
made by the United States District Court for the Nor-
thern District of Florida and affirmed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit United States Court of Appeals. 
Escambia County voters elect their five member 
Board of County Commissioners in accordance with an 
at-large voting system. Under this system, candidates 
run for numbered places corresponding to the districts 
in which they live, but each must be elected by voters of 
the entire county. Although blacks comprise seventeen 
percent of the registered voters in Escambia County, 
none of the four blacks who had run for the county 
commission had been elected. In 1977, a class action suit 
was initiated on behalf of black citizens of Escambia 
County, who claimed that the county's at-large election 
scheme improperly diluted their votes and thus was 
infirm under several federal civil rights statutes and 
various constitutional provisions. 
(Note: Also at issue in the 1977 litigation was the 
propriety of the method of election for the Pensacola 
City Council and the Pensacola School Board. In both 
situations, the district court concluded that the method 
of election was unconstitutional and the court of appeals 
affirmed that ruling. In regard to the school board, the 
district concluded that a 194 7 Florida statute mandating 
an at-large system for electing board members was 
borne from a desire to exclude blacks. Prior to 1945, 
school board members were elected in single-member 
district elections. Candidates in these elections were se-
lected through all-white primaries. In 1945, that election 
scheme was declared unconstitutional. In the next legis-
lative session, Florida switched to at-large school board 
elections. The Escambia County district concluded that 
this change purposefully sought to dilute black voting 
strength through the use of an at-large system. More 
complex than the school board issue was the Escambia 
County district court's invalidation of the method of 
election for the Pensacola City Council. Prior to 1959, 
the city council consisted of ten members: five were 
elected from single-member wards and five were elected 
at-large but with a ward residency requirement. In 1959, 
an exclusively at-large method of election was adopted 
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- apparently in response to the fact that, in 1955, a 
black ran a very close race against a white for one of the 
single-member seats. The Escambia County district 
court concluded that the 1959 change was racially moti-
vated and thus invalidated the at-large method of elec-
tion. 
Black voters contended that both the effect and the 
purpose of Escambia County's at-large election scheme 
was to prevent black candidates from attaining a major-
ity of the voters in the county commission elections. In 
support of their contention, black plaintiffs demon-
strated that there had been a consistent pattern of ra-
cially polarized voting. Other circumstantial evidence 
was also introduced by black plaintiffs to demonstrate 
that the at-large system had been maintained to prevent 
the election of blacks: "The adverse effects of past dis-
crimination by the state and county governments on 
blacks' exercise of their suffrage rights and participation 
in the political system, the depressed economic status of 
blacks in the county, the tenuousness of the state policy 
behind the at-large system, and the county commission-
er's refusal to submit to voters a proposed referendum 
that would change the election system from at-large to 
single-member districts . . . " Countering this evidence, 
Escambia County officials stressed their general repre-
hensiveness to the needs of black citizens, their opinion 
that at-large elections would make representative more 
sensitive to county needs and black plaintiffs failure to 
introduce any direct evidence which suggests that racial 
discrimination was the basis of their interest in maintain-
ing the at-large system. 
In December of 1979, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Florida upheld plaintiffs claims 
and ordered the Escambia County commissioners to 
submit a proposal to rectify the constitutional defect. 
The county commission submitted a mixed single-mem-
ber/at-large election scheme which they had adopted by 
ordinance. The voters of Escambia County rejected this 
proposal in a referendum election, however. Yet, the 
Escambia County commissioners contended that they 
had authority to unilaterally pass the ordinance. The 
district court disagreed and mandated single-member 
district elections. Supreme Court cases addressing reme-
dies for unconstitutional vote dilution have distin-
guished between judicially imposed and legislatively 
adopted plans. While a judicial remedy must employ-
single-member district, legislative plans may include 
multi-member district and at-large election components. 
In February, 1981, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court ruling. The ap-
pellate court concluded that the Supreme Court's 1980 
Mobile v. Bolden decision disapproved of the sort of evi-
dence utilized by the district court in concluding that the 
at-large election scheme was maintained for racially dis-
criminatory reasons. In September. 1982, the appellate 
court reversed its 1981 decision in response to the Su-
252 
preme Court's decision in Rogers v. Lodge. (102 S.Ct. 
3272 (1982)) 
Rogers v. Lodge, as interpreted by the appellate court, 
reflects a more favorable view of the circumstantial evi-
dence which was the basis of the district court ruling. 
Rogers also requires appellate courts to defer to district 
courts' factual findings of intent because such findings 
"represent ... a blend of history and an intensely local 
appraisal of the design and impact of the [election 
system at issue] in light of past and present reality, 
political and otherwise." In light of Rogers, the appellate 
court concluded that the district court's ruling was 
within the bounds of its authority. 
The appellate court also concluded that the county 
commission was prohibited from unilaterally restricting 
its election system under the Florida Constitution. The 
crux of this holding was that Escambia County Commis-
sion was a noncharter government and, under the state 
constitution, its legislative powers encompassed only 
those areas specifically provided by state laws. State law 
would have permitted the Escambia County voters to 
enact a reappointment scheme. Yet, the appellate court 
felt that state law did not specifically provide such power 
to the county commission. Consequently, the appellate 
court affirmed the district court single-member district 
remedy since the county commission was without power 
to implement its self-initiated remedial plan - a plan 
which would have combined components of at-large and 
single-member district election schemes. 
Defendant Escambia County Commission appealed 
the appellate court ruling to the Supreme Court. Two 
issues predominate their appeal, namely: l) whether the 
appellate court was too deferential in its review of dis-
trict court factfinding, and 2) whether the Florida Con-
stitution permits the county commission to unilaterally 
restructure its election system. 
The thrust of the county commission's argument is 
that the appellate court misunderstood the Supreme 
Court's Rogers v. Lodge decision. First, the county com-
mission contends that Rogers did not loosen the Mobile v. 
Bolden criteria for a finding of purposeful discrimina-
tion. Instead, Rogers, according to the commission, was a 
fact-specific decision involving a more substantial evi-
dentiary demonstration by black plaintiffs. Second, the 
commission argues that Rogers, because of plaintiffs 
strong evidentiary record, does not suggest that appel-
late courts be especially deferential to district court find-
ings of racially discriminatory intent. Third, the 
commission contends that the Escambia County district 
court ruling was clearly erroneous and thus should be 
reversed. In support of this conclusion, the commission 
suggests that the district court improperly relied on 
insignificant circumstantial evidence. Contrasting this 
view, black plaintiffs argue that the district court ruling 
should be affirmed since the commissioner's good gov-
ernment justification for at-large elections was unbelie-
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vable. For black plaintiffs, the fact that each 
commissioner has special ties to one of five single-dis-
tricts negates the commissioner's proffered rationale of 
each commissioner's serving as county - not district -
representatives. 
In addition to their contention that the district 
court's ruling on the issue of liability was clearly erro-
neous, the Escambia County Commission also argues 
that the district court was in error on the issue of rem-
edy. Rejecting the district court view that the commis-
sion was without authority to unilaterally adopt a 
combined single-member/at-large voting scheme, the 
commission argued that Florida law authorizes it to uni-
laterally respond to the courts' invalidation of at-large 
elections. The commission contends that its authority 
stems from a Florida constitutional provision that per-
mits county commissions to enact ordinances .. not incon-
sistent with general or special law." Since Florida's 
requirement that nonchartered county's (which do not 
change their method of election through Home Rule 
Act referendum) have at-large elections was invalidated 
as it applied to Escambia County, the county commission 
believes that it can now act unilaterally without violating 
Florida law. Black plaintiffs contend that this argument 
is spurious. In support of this contention, black plain-
tiffs refer to an opinion of the state attorney general 
which concluded that a "[nonchartered] county is with-
out authority under state law to enact a singJe-member 
system or other alternatives to a purely at-large election 
system for county commissioners." 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The Escambia County lawsuit is of potentially great 
significance to Escambia County, the state of Florida and 
the nation. In Escambia County, a black candidate is 
expected to become a county commissioner under the 
district court ordered single-member district election 
plan. In Florida, the state legislature- at the suggestion 
of the state attorney general- is considering the enact-
ment of legislation which could permit (or mandate) 
nonchartered county governments to switch from at-
large to single-member district election schemes. The 
Florida Attorney General made this recommendation 
since several Florida nonchartered counties with 
insubstantial minority representation will incur substan-
tial legal costs as well as have their local elections held up 
if area blacks challenge their at-large· election proce-
dures. 
On the national level, Escambia County raises two im-
portant issues, namely, 1) the narrow issue of whether 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is an effective tool in voter dilution challenges, and 
2) the more general issue of what constitutes proof of 
intentional racial discrimination. The common percep-
tion that Congress had to incorporate an .. effects" or 
"results" oriented standard in the 1982 amendment of 
lssueNo.l4 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act may- to some extent 
- be limited by the Escambia County lawsuit. Excepting 
proof that at-large elections had a racially disproportio-
nate effect, black plaintiffs in Escambia County could 
introduce very little in the way of hard or substantial 
evidence that the county commission was maintaining 
the at-large election system for racially discriminatory 
reasons. At the same time, black plaintiffs were able to 
introduce suggestive or circumstantial evidence which 
called into question the county commission's proferred 
""good government" rationale for at-large elections. 
A Supreme Court ruling in favor of black plaintiffs 
on constitutional grounds would indicate that Equal 
Protection Clause voter dilution challenges will be 
successful if plaintiffs introduce: 1) proof of dispropor-
tionate impact, plus 2) substantial- but not overwhelm-
ing - circumstantial evidence which hints at a racially 
discriminatory purpose. Although section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act might already mandate an identical result 
on statutory grounds, the constitutional ruling is signifi-
cant since it establishes a standard which can only be 
modified by the Supreme Court, rather than the Con-
gress. 
A ruling in favor of black plaintiffs also suggests that 
at-large election schemes with a racially disproportio-
nate impact in communities with a history of purposeful 
racial discrimination are per se unconstitutional. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that the most signifi-
cant piece of "suggestive" evidence introduced by black 
plaintiffs concerned the history of intentional discrimi-
nation in Escambia County and the state of Florida. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court could limit a holding 
favorable to black plaintiffs in Escambia County by stres-
sing the import of other bits of "suggestive," 
"circumstantial" evidence. 
The most significant aspect of Escambia County might 
be the Court's general ruling on what constitutes inten-
tional racial discrimination since voting is only one con-
text in which invidious racial discrimination might occur 
and since the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments pro-
tect this right on statutory grounds. Escambia County 
might prove most significant in areas subject to racial 
discrimination which lack supplemental statutory pro-
tections. In the 1977 Arlington Heights decision, the Su-
preme Court set out several factors which indicate 
discriminatory intent. (429 U.S. 252 (1977)) They are: 1) 
the effect of the official action; 2) the historical back-
ground of the decision; 3) the sequence of events; 4) 
substantive and procedural departures, and 5) legisla-
tive history. Proof of intentional discrimination in Es-
cambia County relies primarily on the first two of these 
five components. Consequently, a ruling in favor of 
black plaintiffs would suggest that a district court judge 
has substantial leeway to assess on a case by case basis the 
contours of the Equal Protection Clause protections. 
Again, the Supreme Court could seek to modi£\' the 
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apparent breadth of such a holding by suggesting that 
black plaintiffs made an especially strong factual show-
ing in Escambia County. 
ARGUMENTS 
For Black Plaintiffs 
l. The Escambia County Commission violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
retaining for race-motivated reasons an at-large elec-
tion scheme with a racially disproportionate impact. 
2. The district court property relied on substantial 
circumstantial evidence and thus its finding of purpo-
seful racial discrimination was not clearly erroneous. 
3. The Escambia County Commission - as a nonchar-
tered county government - lacked authority to uni-
laterally implement a combination at-large/single-
member election scheme. 
4. The district court acted within its authority by order-
ing a single-member election scheme in Escambia 
County. 
For Escambia County 
l. The Escambia County Commission maintained the 
at-large election scheme for reasons of "good govern-
ment''- not racial discrimination . 
2. By failing to base its determination on "direct" evi-
dence, the district court's finding of purposeful racial 
discrimination was clearly erroneous. 
3. The Escambia County Commission was authorized to 
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unilaterally adopt a combination at-large/single-
member election scheme since its action was not in-
consistent with effective Florida laws. 
4. The district court transgressed the county commis-
sion's legislative authority by mandating the imple-
mentation of a single-member election scheme. 
AMICUS ARGUMENTS 
In Support of Black Plaintiffs 
The Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 
filed an amicus brief which contained an argument iden-
tical to that made by black plaintiffs. 
In Support of Escambia County 
The State Association of County Commissioners of 
Florida and twenty-one nonchartered Florida counties 
filed a joint amicus brief. In an effort to buttress the 
arguments made by Escambia County, this amicus brief 
stressed that: l) the district court failed to recognize the 
fact specific nature of Rogers v . Lodge in its determina-
tion of purposeful discrimination, and 2) the countv 
commission's authority to unilaterally adopt a combin~­
tion at-large/single-member voting scheme was also sup-
ported by case law and legislati\'e comment not cited in 
Escambia Countv's appellant brief. An amicus brief was 
also filed by Orange County, Florida. This brief limited 
itself to whether noncharter county go\'ernment's rna\· 
unilaterally amend voting procedures. . 
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